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The past couple of decades witnessed an explosion of responsibility studies, with a number of 
new topics and areas of research emerging along with intensified interest toward existing 
theories and approaches. Undoubtedly, this focus on responsibility has led to the advancement 
of much-needed resources for addressing, inter alia, new existential threats, including climate 
change and unprecedented technological developments in such areas as artificial intelligence. 
At the same time, however, the sheer volume and increasing complexity of the work conducted 
on different aspects of responsibility, across a variety of disciplines, resulted in a less welcome 
trend toward fragmentation of the debate into separate conversations. Such conversations on 
the many dimensions of responsibility have featured prominently across a number of debates 
in practical philosophy, including legal, political, moral philosophy, and applied ethics. In order 
to make sense of the different strands of research they have originated, Ethical Theory and 
Moral Practice has dedicated its 20th Anniversary Conference to exploring them. The 
Conference was held in June 2017 at the Department of Political and Social Sciences of the 
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University of Pavia. Alongside the keynote addresses by Carla Bagnoli, Ian Carter, and Antony 
Duff, it brought together scholars from different philosophical traditions to explore the 
dimensions along which the many issues concerning the idea of individual and collective 
responsibility play out and discuss its normative implications for the establishment of 
individual and collective rights and duties. The seven papers selected for this 20th Anniversary 
Issue originate from that conference. They share the ambition of countering the trend of 
fragmenting the philosophical debate around responsibility by bringing together helpful 
insights on related dimensions of this idea and its implications. The discussion is organised 
around three main themes. 
1. Accountability, Attributability, Answerability, Liability  
A finer-grained analysis of responsibility reveals consistent patterns of ascription where a more 
specific responsibility concept, such as accountability but not attributability, for instance, might 
be at work. What is the relationship between these concepts and their respective patterns of 
ascription? Is there a principled way of negotiating between the diverging conclusions we reach 
by following one instead of another pattern? In her paper, Robin Zheng addresses these issues 
by identifying two separate clusters of responsibility concerns, a backward- and a forward-
looking one. While the former requires a conception of responsibility grounded in the 
metaphysics of agency, which according to Zheng is best understood in terms of attributability, 
the latter is suitably defined in moral and political terms that derive from the accountability 
individuals have for the way they perform in the social roles they happen to inhabit. The paper 
by Antony Duff elucidates the relationship between accountability, answerability and liability 
by focussing on the logic of criminal justice proceedings. According to Duff, while both 
answerability and liability are aspects of accountability, answerability is key. The four criteria 
of answerability Duff identifies apply beyond concerns for fair trial to support the underlying 
idea of morality as a conversation between interlocutors bound to recognise each other as 
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equals. This idea is taken further by Emanuela Ceva and Lubomira Radoilska who argue for a 
new understanding of responsibility focussed on reason-giving as a core dimension that also 
underpins the better researched dimensions of intentional actions and attitudes toward others. 
According to Ceva and Radoilska, reason-giving is subject to stringent success criteria bringing 
together backward- and forward-looking considerations. By discussing the case of assigning 
individual responsibilities in such cases of problematic shared action as systemic corruption, 
the essay offers a common ground for local conceptions of responsibility, such as 
accountability, answerability, and attributability and explains which of the patterns of 
ascription is better suited to specific contexts. 
2. Individuals, Collectives, Practices, and Institutions  
Discussions of moral responsibility often concentrate on individual agents and their actions, 
sometimes in isolation from the social institutions and group belonging that make such actions 
possible in the first instance. On the other extreme, emphasising structural injustices and the 
unconscious psychological mechanisms, through which they typically get perpetrated, might 
prompt a similar gap between collective and individual-level analysis. This gap generates a 
number of puzzles with respect to the moral appraisal of groups and individuals’ actions, the 
fair allocation of rights and duties within and across political communities, and the very 
possibility of social change and concerted action. Gianfranco Pellegrino offers a principled 
way of addressing these and related concerns in the context of climate change. The contributive 
view that Pellegrino puts forward highlights the interactions between the causal and non-causal 
aspects of individual responsibility for collective harms. While the former requires establishing 
a degree of likelihood, the latter tracks mere possibility. This analysis supports the ascription 
of a robust yet differential responsibility for climate change to individuals, in addition to 
institutional and collective obligations. Ian Carter considers a related puzzle, about collective 
responsibility for individual choices. The puzzle arises for proponents of the starting-gate 
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interpretation of the principle of equality of opportunity, who are nevertheless struck by the 
intuitive unfairness of asking individuals to 772 E. Ceva, L. Radoilska shoulder on their own 
the extreme outcomes of the unwise choices they made long time ago. The solution proposed 
by Carter is to introduce some minimally prudent restrictions on individual choices at the 
starting-gate point. Such a policy would not undermine the liability that individuals have for 
their own choices over time and will, therefore, be consistent with treating all individuals in 
accordance with the demands of opacity respect within a community of moral equals. The paper 
by Ceva and Radoilska contributes to this theme too by building on a continuist interpretation 
of systemic corruption, according to which there cannot be institutional corruption in the 
absence of corrupt individual actions. Following this interpretation, the authors argue that the 
public unavowability that characterises systemic corruption as a sustained practice rests on the 
thorough yet misleading redescriptions corrupt individuals readily offer when giving reasons 
for their involvement in these activities. The fact that these redescriptions are typically not 
presented with the explicit intention to deceive points to a kind of tainted reasoning at the 
interface between epistemic vice and disadvantage, best understood as a sui generis form of 
(rather than ground for diminished) responsibility. 
3. Harms and Wrongs  
Responding appropriately to harms, e.g. by preventing them, identifying and holding to account 
the responsible, apologising to the harmed or making some other amends, is an essential aspect 
of many practices, which responsibility studies seek to inform. Yet, on closer inspection, the 
notion of harm might not be sufficient to fulfil all dialectical tasks that it has been called to 
perform. Björn Petersson’s paper raises an important challenge in this respect. By reflecting on 
the intuitive yet misleading appeal of the plural harm principle, Petersson demonstrates it to be 
the effect of imperceptible shifts in distributive and collective readings of plurality in instances 
of over-determination. This conclusion is significant as it indicates that, in these instances, the 
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notion of harm cannot account for the wrongness of getting involved, which requires an 
independent analysis of co-responsibility. The argument has wider implications for revisiting 
the relationship between harm and responsibility. According to Petersson, anyone persuaded 
by the simple counterfactual analysis of harm as making a difference to the worse will have to 
supply a further account of what makes a harmful act wrong to avoid a similar challenge to the 
one affecting the plural harm principle. Carla Bagnoli identifies and explores a distinctive 
wrong arising in cases of successful coercion. As Bagnoli shows, standard approaches to 
coercion overlook this wrong in virtue of interpreting coerced agency as obstructed or 
diminished in scope, whereby the coercee is less of an agent and more of a tool at the hands of 
the coercer. Yet, successful coercion builds on the mutual recognition between parties as 
rational agents. This recognition has a deeply corrosive effect on the moral agency of the 
coercees that can only be offset by their claiming responsibility for acting under duress. This 
insight is echoed in the Role-Ideal Model developed by Zheng, where individual role-holders 
are encouraged to take up responsibility for the ways, in which their agency improves structural 
relationships or, indeed, fails to do so. 
